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 Forest owners and carbon markets 
Industries Forest owners 
Offsets by paying 
Forest Carbon  
Small Landholders  
(?) 
• MARKET EXCLUSION: large land cover under management to 
provide a stable carbon stock over time  
 
• LACK OF INFORMATION: Lack of access to carbon markets 
 
• HIGH COSTS: Transaction costs tend to be high  
 
• ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS:  It could reduce carbon reservoirs  
Sources: (Cacho, et al., 2005; Roshetko et al., 2006; Roncoli et al., 2007; Pfaff, et al., 2007; Bigsby, 2009; 
Galiok, et al., 2009; Bigsby, 2009; Milder, Scherr & Bracer, 2010; De Pinto, et al., 2010; Beddoe, 2010) 
 
 Forest owners and carbon markets 
Industries 
Forest 
owners 
BANK 
Carbon Banking 
Approach 
Forest Carbon  
Annual rental payments 
Forest Carbon   
Forest Carbon 
Annual rental payments 
Annual rental payments 
Forest Carbon  
Research Questions 
What is the potential of the carbon banking approach to include the forestry 
and agro-forestry systems of small land owners in Guatemala into the carbon 
trading system, and through this provide payments for retaining forest? 
What is the size of the effective carbon 
pool provided by small landowners, 
accounting for  forest fire risk?   
How much can the carbon bank 
afford to pay small landowners for 
sequestering carbon? 
Methods 
Risk Analysis 
 
• Monte Carlo analysis 
• Model risk of losing forest through fires in three Zones 
• Probability  
• 10,000 iterations 
 
Carbon Payment Analysis 
 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• 3 scenarios 
 
Results 
Zones 
Area of forest 
land deposited 
in the bank (ha) 
Volume of carbon 
deposited (tCO2) 
Risk-adjusted 
carbon available for 
lease  (% ) 
Bank annual 
revenue 
(USD4.80/tCO2) 
Dry 1,454.94 37,807.42 97.13% 8,906.70 
Montane 7,593.67 1,494,996.42 98.87% 358,511.69 
Wet and moist 26,100.12 4,876,684.30 96.35% 1,139,685.24 
TOTAL 35,148.73 6,409,488.14   1,507,103.63 
Number of small forest owners = 6,734  
Cost of the Carbon Bank 
Variable costs
Variable cost per land owner
Other associated costs when issuing one contract 
(energy, printers, paper, etc)
Administrative fee 6,734 1.00 6,734.00
6,734.00Subtotal 
Fixed costs 
Operational costs Type of cost Units
Cost per unit  
(USD)
Total cost 
(USD)
3 carbon management experts Administrative fee 3 40,000.00 120,000.00
Monitoring Plan Consultancy fee 1 20,000.00 20,000.00
Monitoring at field level Adminstrative fee 1 95,000.00 95,000.00
Verification of monitoring developed by third party Auditor fee 1 45,000.00 45,000.00
Subtotal 430,000.00
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
100% 0.167 0.155 0.143 0.132 0.120 0.108
90% 0.160 0.148 0.136 0.124 0.113 0.101
80% 0.150 0.138 0.127 0.115 0.103 0.091
70% 0.138 0.126 0.115 0.103 0.091 0.079
60% 0.122 0.111 0.099 0.087 0.075 0.063
50% 0.100 0.088 0.076 0.065 0.053 0.041
40% 0.066 0.055 0.043 0.031 0.019 0.008
30% 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 -0.025 -0.037 -0.048
20% -0.101 -0.113 -0.125 -0.137 -0.148 -0.160
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
Scenario 1 with USD 430,000 
(USD/tCO2/yr) 
80% 0.138 
5% 
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
100% 0.184 0.172 0.160 0.148 0.137 0.125
90% 0.178 0.166 0.155 0.143 0.131 0.119
80% 0.171 0.159 0.148 0.136 0.124 0.112
70% 0.162 0.150 0.139 0.127 0.115 0.103
60% 0.150 0.138 0.127 0.115 0.103 0.091
50% 0.133 0.122 0.110 0.098 0.086 0.075
40% 0.108 0.097 0.085 0.073 0.061 0.050
30% 0.066 0.055 0.043 0.031 0.019 0.008
20% -0.017 -0.029 -0.041 -0.053 -0.065 -0.076
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
Scenario 2 reducing 25% of fixed costs 
(USD/tCO2/yr) 
80  0.159 
5% 
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
100% 0.201 0.189 0.177 0.165 0.154 0.142
90% 0.197 0.185 0.173 0.162 0.150 0.138
80% 0.192 0.180 0.169 0.157 0.145 0.133
70% 0.186 0.174 0.163 0.151 0.139 0.127
60% 0.178 0.166 0.155 0.143 0.131 0.119
50% 0.167 0.155 0.143 0.132 0.120 0.108
40% 0.150 0.138 0.127 0.115 0.103 0.091
30% 0.122 0.111 0.099 0.087 0.075 0.063
20% 0.066 0.055 0.043 0.031 0.019 0.008
10% -0.101 -0.113 -0.125 -0.137 -0.148 -0.160
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
80% 0.18 
5% 
Scenario 3 reducing 50% of fixed costs 
(USD/tCO2/yr) 
Is it enough money per Ha/yr? 
(USD/tCO2/yr) 
0.14 0.16 0.18
Scenario 1 
(USD/ha/yr)
Scenario 2 
(USD/ha/yr)
Scenario 3 
(USD/ha/yr)
Dry 25.99 3.59 3.90 4.68
Montane 196.87 27.17 29.53 35.44
Wet and Moist 186.85 25.78 28.03 33.63
Maximum payment to small forest 
owners (USD/tCO2e/yr)
Average of carbon 
sequestered 
(tCO2e/ha/yr)
Zones
Conclusions 
•The three zones have more than 96% of forest carbon available for leasing 
in carbon markets when adjusted for fire risk.  
•Considering 80% of participation of small landowners and 5% of profit for 
the bank , the best scenario for the bank is No. 3 as it can afford USD 
0.18/tCO2/yr.  However, from small landowner’s perspective their  level of 
involvement into the scheme will rely on whether  they have additional 
economic activities or not.  
•The maximum price paid to small forest owners depends on the bank’s 
profit rates, the level of small landowners’ participation as well as a how 
effective the bank can manage fixed costs.    
Thank you for your attention!  
